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The Challenges of Risk 
Management in Diversified 
Financial Companies
n recent years, financial institutions and their supervisors 
have placed increased emphasis on the importance of 
consolidated risk management. Consolidated risk 
management—sometimes also called integrated or 
enterprisewide risk management—can have many specific 
meanings, but in general it refers to a coordinated process for 
measuring and managing risk on a firmwide basis. Interest in 
consolidated risk management has arisen for a variety of 
reasons. Advances in information technology and financial 
engineering have made it possible to quantify risks more 
precisely. The wave of mergers—both in the United States and 
overseas—has resulted in significant consolidation in the 
financial services industry as well as in larger, more complex 
financial institutions. The recently enacted Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act seems likely to heighten interest in consolidated risk 
management, as the legislation opens the door to combinations 
of financial activities that had previously been prohibited.
This article examines the economic rationale for managing 
risk on a firmwide, consolidated basis. Our goal is to lay out 
some of the key issues that supervisors and risk management 
practitioners have confronted in assessing and developing 
consolidated risk management systems. In doing so, we hope to 
clarify for a wider audience why the ideal of consolidated risk 
management—which may seem uncontroversial or even 
obvious—involves significant conceptual and practical issues. 
We also hope to suggest areas where research by practitioners 
and academics could help resolve some of these issues.
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• Although the benefits of a consolidated, or 
firmwide, system of risk management are 
widely recognized, financial firms have 
traditionally taken a more segmented 
approach to risk measurement and control.
• The cost of integrating information across 
business lines and the existence of regulatory 
barriers to moving capital and liquidity within 
a financial organization appear to have 
discouraged firms from adopting consolidated 
risk management.
• In addition, there are substantial conceptual 
and technical challenges to be overcome in 
developing risk management systems that 
can assess and quantify different types of risk 
across a wide range of business activities.
• However, recent advances in information 
technology, changes in regulation, and 
breakthroughs in risk management 
methodology suggest that the barriers to 
consolidated risk management will fall 
during the coming months and years. 
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I2 The Challenges of Risk Management
The approach we take is to review the arguments made by 
supervisors and the financial industry in favor of consolidated 
risk management. While both parties agree on the importance 
of this type of risk management, this support seems to be 
motivated by quite different concerns. Supervisors appear to 
support it out of a safety-and-soundness concern that 
significant risks could be overlooked or underestimated in the 
absence of firmwide risk assessment.1 In contrast, financial 
institutions appear willing to undertake significant efforts to 
develop consolidated risk management systems because they 
believe that those systems will help them assess the risk and 
return of different business lines and thus allow them to make 
more informed decisions about where to invest scarce 
resources to maximize profits.2 While these two views may 
reflect quite different underlying motivations for supporting 
consolidated risk management, we argue below that they result 
in a common emphasis on the importance of accurate 
assessments of risk.
Although both supervisors and financial institutions 
support the concept of consolidated risk management, few if 
any financial firms have fully developed systems in place today. 
The absence thus far of fully implemented consolidated risk 
management systems suggests that there are significant costs or 
obstacles that have historically led firms to manage risk in a 
more segmented fashion. We argue that both information costs 
and regulatory costs play an important role here by affecting 
the trade-off between the value derived from consolidated risk 
management and the expense of constructing these complex 
risk management systems. In addition, there are substantial 
technical hurdles involved in developing risk management 
systems that span a wide range of businesses and types of risk. 
Both of these factors are evolving in ways that suggest that the 
barriers to consolidated risk management are increasingly 
likely to fall over the coming months and years.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the 
next section, we describe the concept of consolidated risk 
management in greater detail and provide a more in-depth 
discussion of the views of supervisors and the financial industry 
about this process. We then offer a critical analysis of these 
views, using a simple portfolio model to help illustrate the 
economic rationale behind consolidated risk management. 
Next, we discuss the constraints that have slowed many 
financial institutions in their implementation of consolidated 
risk management systems. We conclude with a discussion of 
the major technical challenges and research questions that will 
need to be addressed as an increasing number of financial firms 
implement firmwide risk management systems.
Consolidated Risk Management:
Definitions and Motivations
At a very basic level, consolidated risk management entails a 
coordinated process of measuring and managing risk on a 
firmwide basis. This process has two distinct, although related, 
dimensions: coordinated risk assessment and management 
across the different types of risk facing the firm (market risk, 
credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk), and integrated risk 
evaluation across the firm’s various geographic locations, legal 
entities, and business lines. In theory, both dimensions must be 
addressed to produce a consolidated, firmwide assessment of 
risk. In practice, few financial firms currently have in place a 
consolidated risk management system that fully incorporates 
both dimensions, although many large institutions—both in 
the United States and overseas—appear to be devoting 
significant resources to developing such systems (Joint Forum 
1999a).3
To understand consolidated risk management, it is 
important to recognize the distinction between risk 
measurement and risk management. Risk measurement entails 
the quantification of risk exposures. This quantification may 
take a variety of forms—value-at-risk, earnings-at-risk, stress 
scenario analyses, duration gaps—depending on the type of 
risk being measured and the degree of sophistication of the 
estimates. Risk management, in contrast, refers to the overall 
process that a financial institution follows to define a business 
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strategy, to identify the risks to which it is exposed, to quantify 
those risks, and to understand and control the nature of the 
risks it faces. Risk management is a series of business decisions, 
accompanied by a set of checks and balances—risk limits, 
independent risk management functions, risk reporting, 
review and oversight by senior management and the board of 
directors—in which risk measurement plays an important, 
although not all-encompassing, role. Thus, consolidated risk 
management involves not only an attempt to quantify risk 
across a diversified firm, but also a much broader process of 
business decision making and of support to management in 
order to make informed decisions about the extent of risk taken 
both by individual business lines and by the firm as a whole.
Recent trends in the financial services industry have 
increased the challenges associated with this process. To begin, 
financial institutions increasingly have the opportunity to 
become involved in a diverse range of financial activities. In the 
United States, bank holding companies have been able to 
combine traditional banking and securities activities since the 
late 1980s, when the Federal Reserve permitted the creation of 
“Section 20” securities subsidiaries. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act will now enable affiliations involving banking, securities, 
and insurance underwriting in so-called financial holding 
companies (FHCs). Such combinations of diverse financial 
activities present significant challenges to consolidated risk 
management systems, as greater diversity often means that the 
system must encompass a wider range of risk types.4
Consolidation in the financial services industry has 
produced institutions with operations spanning large 
geographic areas, both domestically and internationally. Such 
wide geographic dispersion, especially across time zones, can 
make it difficult for a firm’s management to keep track of the 
activities across all of its operating centers. Financial 
institutions have responded to this situation by increasing the 
resources devoted to information systems designed to track 
and monitor exposures worldwide. Indeed, the development of 
coordinated information systems is one of the most important 
steps in consolidated risk management.
The supervisory community has advocated that financial 
institutions adopt consolidated risk management procedures 
in the guidance it has published in the 1990s, especially 
guidance for banking companies. In the United States, these 
efforts began in 1993 with guidelines for supervisors evaluating 
risk management in derivatives and trading activities, and have 
continued to date, most recently with a 1999 Federal Reserve 
paper containing broad conceptual guidelines for evaluating 
capital adequacy in light of the full range of risks facing the 
bank or bank holding company.5 Internationally, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision extended the framework 
for describing the risk management process to encompass the 
role of business strategy and the activities of business line 
decision makers.6 The Committee also set out an approach to 
the supervisory review of a bank’s internal assessment of capital 
adequacy in light of a firm’s overall risks as the second pillar of 
the proposed new capital adequacy framework (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 1999b).
Recently, an international forum of banking, securities, and 
insurance supervisors issued a report containing principles that 
supervisors should follow to ensure that financial 
conglomerates are adequately identifying and managing risk. 
The report’s lead recommendation is that “supervisors should 
take steps . . . to provide that conglomerates have adequate risk 
management processes in place to manage group-wide risk 
concentrations” (Joint Forum 1999a).
The rationale offered by supervisors for the importance of 
consolidated risk management seems to be a concern that, in 
the absence of a firmwide assessment, significant risks could be 
overlooked or underestimated. The Joint Forum report, for 
instance, argues that “the additive nature of concentrations and 
the risk of transmission of material problems within a 
conglomerate point to the value of both conglomerate 
management and supervisors conducting a group-wide 
assessment of potential concentrations” (Joint Forum 1999a). 
The underlying concern is that such underestimated or 
overlooked risks receive insufficient management attention 
and have the potential to produce unexpectedly large losses 
that could threaten the firm’s financial health.
Financial market practitioners also cite the interdependent 
nature of risks within an organization as a motivation to 
develop consolidated risk management systems. For instance, 
echoing sentiments in the supervisors’ Joint Forum report, 
Lam (1999) argues that “managing risk by silos simply doesn’t 
work, because the risks are highly interdependent and cannot 
be segmented and managed solely by independent units” in the 
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firm. Similarly, a senior executive at a major U.S. bank asserts 
that “the careful identification and analysis of risk are, 
however, only useful insofar as they lead to a capital allocation 
system that recognizes different degrees of risk and includes all 
elements of risk” (Labrecque 1998).
In contrast to the supervisors, however, the primary 
implication that Lam and others draw from this finding 
concerns the role that consolidated risk management systems 
can play in helping firms to make better-informed decisions 
about how to invest scarce capital and human resources. For 
instance, Mudge (2000) stresses that a consistent framework 
for evaluating firmwide risk and return across diverse financial 
activities is a key to evaluating the benefits of potential mergers 
among banking and insurance firms. Similarly, Lam (1999) 
argues that consolidated risk management systems can help 
firms understand the risk/return trade-offs among different 
business lines, customers, and potential acquisitions. 
Furthermore, consolidated risk management may allow a firm 
to recognize “natural hedges”—when one entity within the 
firm has positions or is engaged in activities that hedge the 
positions or activities of another part of the firm—that may 
become apparent only when risk is examined from the 
perspective of the consolidated institution. Firms that fail to 
recognize the diversification effects of such natural hedges may 
waste resources on redundant hedging by individual units 
within the organization.
Thus, while both supervisors and financial institutions agree 
on the importance of consolidated risk management and point 
to the same driving factors, their conclusions about the role 
that these systems can play emphasize quite different concerns. 
At one level, this difference is not surprising, given the different 
objectives of supervisors and financial institutions (safety and 
soundness, on the one hand, and profit maximization, on the 
other). On another level, these concerns are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the next section, we argue that 
supervisors’ emphasis on underestimation of firmwide risk 
and financial institutions’ emphasis on enhanced under-
standing of the risk/return trade-off among different activities 
reflect a common emphasis on the importance of accurate 
assessments of risk.
Understanding the Role
of Consolidated Risk Management
The discussion above reflects a well-established belief on the 
part of financial institutions and supervisors in the importance 
of consolidated risk management. But what economic 
fundamentals underlie this belief? In this section, we assess the 
views of supervisors and financial institutions and try to place 
them in a common framework. We do not attempt to address 
the question of why firms choose to manage risk at all.7 Instead, 
we try to understand why it matters whether risk is managed on 
a consolidated basis or at the level of individual businesses or 
risks within a firm.
The Supervisors’ View: Spillover Effects
We first consider the view expressed by supervisors in the Joint 
Forum paper (1999a), namely, that in the absence of 
consolidated risk management, significant risks could be 
overlooked or underestimated. To gain some insight into this 
view, it is helpful to consider a simple portfolio approach to 
assessing the risk of a diversified financial firm. This approach 
helps illustrate how the perception of the overall risk facing the 
firm would differ if institutions managed their risk in an 
integrated way instead of by individual businesses or legal 
entities within the larger organization.
To begin, suppose that a financial firm has two business 
lines, each of which earns profits that vary uncertainly over 
time. Application of standard portfolio theory suggests that the 
risk of the overall firm will depend on the variation in each 
unit’s profits and the extent to which variation in these profits 
is correlated between the two units. In particular, the risk facing 
the consolidated firm will be less than or equal to the sum of the 
risks facing the individual business units within the firm 
whenever this correlation is less than perfect. In this situation, 
the profit variation in one unit diversifies the risk of the other.8
The importance of this observation for our purposes is that 
it suggests that establishing risk monitoring and control (such 
as limits) at the business level and then summing up across 
business lines would be a conservative approach to managing 
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and assessing the overall risk facing the firm, since it ignores 
any potential diversification effects across business lines. This 
conclusion stands in marked contrast to the arguments 
advanced by supervisors in favor of consolidated risk 
management. How can we reconcile these two outcomes?
The answer, of course, is that the simple portfolio example 
misses some important “real world” aspects of financial risk 
and risk management. Perhaps the most significant of these is 
the assumption that the risks facing each business unit are fixed 
and known. In fact, these risks are functions of many factors 
that can vary significantly over time. In particular, the simple 
portfolio example assumes that the risk profile of one business 
line can be measured without regard to the risks undertaken by 
the other. This assumption is not a statement about the degree 
of correlation between the risks faced by the two business units, 
but rather the idea that the underlying volatility of one business 
line’s profitability may be affected by the actions of another 
business line.
An example of this relationship might be when two or more 
geographic centers within a global financial firm have similar 
positions that they have each hedged in a particular security or 
market. In the absence of a consolidated risk management 
system, the various units could be unaware of the positions that 
other units within the firm have taken.9 Each unit assumes that 
its position is small enough that it would be able to roll over its 
hedges or otherwise take steps to reduce its risk even in the 
event of market stress. However, when the various business 
units try to take these steps simultaneously, their combined 
activity reinforces the liquidity problems facing the market, 
resulting in sharp, adverse moves in the market prices of the 
hedging and/or underlying instruments. Thus, losses at 
individual units exceed the risk assumptions made in each 
unit’s individual risk management plans and the aggregate 
position of the firm is therefore riskier than the sum of the 
assumed individual risks of the business units. In essence, the 
firm faces the “portfolio insurance” problem in that the actions 
of one unit affect the risks facing another.10
These spillover effects can be enhanced during times of crisis 
or severe market disruption. A firm that manages risk on a 
unit-by-unit basis may have to spend valuable time simply 
determining what its aggregate position is in the affected 
markets, rather than being able to react to quickly developing 
market conditions. Since nimbleness in responding to 
problems can affect outcomes favorably, such firms may be at 
a disadvantage compared with smaller firms (for instance, 
compared with a series of smaller firms that are comparable in 
the aggregate to the diversified financial institution) and 
compared with large firms with consolidated risk management 
systems. Such a situation is an example of how the structure of 
the risk management system—as distinct from any ex ante risk-
mitigating actions taken by the firm’s risk managers—may 
affect the aggregate risk facing the firm. Nimbleness is 
especially important if market disruption spreads rapidly from 
market to market in a hard-to-anticipate pattern, as it did in 
1997-98.
In fact, the financial crisis in the fall of 1998 provides some 
interesting insights into the importance of consolidated risk 
management and measurement systems when there are 
linkages across markets. International bank supervisors 
conducted a study of the performance during the market 
upheaval of banks’ risk management systems and the value-at-
risk models used to calculate market risk capital requirements 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1999c). The study 
examined information on the stress testing done by large banks 
in several G-10 countries and found that ex ante stress test 
results provided a better picture of actual outcomes during the 
third quarter of 1998, when those tests were based on actual 
historical experience or hypothetical scenarios that 
incorporated simultaneous movements in a range of rates and 
prices, rather than on large movements in a single market risk 
factor. Thus, firms whose stress testing and risk management 
systems recognized potential linkages across markets had more 
realistic estimates of the way events in the fall of 1998 were 
likely to affect their firms.
Another way in which spillover effects can result in 
aggregate risk exceeding the sum of the individual risks of 
business units within the firm concerns what might be called 
reputational or contagion risk. As discussed in the Joint Forum 
report (1999a), this is the idea that problems in one part of a 
diversified firm may affect confidence in other parts of the 
firm. The situation that the Joint Forum paper appears to have 
in mind is one in which such problems cause acute, near-term 
funding or liquidity problems across the firm, due to questions 
about whether the losses in the troubled business unit are 
evidence of as-yet-unrevealed losses in other business lines.11
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Aside from such near-term concerns, spillover effects can 
also have a longer run dimension. For example, innovative 
businesses or those involving massive technology investments 
can engender what some analysts call “strategic risk.” Failure in 
such ventures may be highly visible and thus likely to have 
spillover effects on other businesses through the cost of capital, 
the cost of funding, and revenue effects through the loss of 
customer approval. Thus, other business lines associated with 
the troubled entity may see their franchise value erode as a 
result of difficulties in an affiliated unit. Such strategic risk may 
be particularly important for institutions for which customer 
trust is a key competitive advantage. Adverse publicity, legal 
judgments against the firm, evidence of fraud or internal theft, 
or high-profile failed business ventures may erode customer 
confidence in an institution. In the extreme, such concerns may 
reach the point where the affected firm is no longer viable as an 
ongoing concern, even though it may technically be solvent.12
This discussion of spillover effects suggests that supervisors’ 
concerns that disaggregated risk management systems 
understate the risks facing diversified financial institutions may 
not be without foundation. Certain important risks may be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate into risk 
management systems that focus on individual business units or 
types of risk alone within a diversified firm. Consolidated risk 
management systems therefore may be necessary to obtain an 
accurate picture of the risks facing a firm and to have in place 
the procedures needed to manage those risks, both on a day-to-
day basis and in stress situations. In this light, supervisors’ 
concerns can be seen not so much as a desire for firms to have 
risk management systems that are conservative, but instead for 
firms to have risk management systems that are accurate.
Consolidated Risk Management 
and the Theory of the Firm
Concerns about understating firmwide risk exposures 
notwithstanding, disaggregated risk management systems may 
also miss instances in which the risks from different units 
within a diversified firm offset one another. The consolidated 
firm would appear to have incentives to manage its risk on an 
aggregate basis whenever these diversification benefits are non-
negligible. At its heart, this is the logic that Lam and others in 
the financial services industry have applied in support of 
consolidated risk management: the idea that a diversified 
financial firm should be viewed as a “portfolio” comprising its 
different units and business lines.
This view is closely related to the broader question of how 
firms decide which activities are coordinated within the firm 
and which activities are coordinated through markets. This 
question has long interested economists, and we can draw on 
the insights of this “theory of the firm” literature to enhance 
our understanding of the role of consolidated risk 
management. Coase (1937) first noted that the efficiency of 
markets might be expected to lead firms to rely on markets and 
contracts with third parties to conduct their activities, but that 
in fact many decisions are made, coordinated, and executed by 
internal mechanisms such as reporting hierarchies, production 
organization, and compensation plans. Coase’s insight was that 
a firm carries out inside the firm those activities that it can 
manage internally at a cost lower than the information and 
transaction costs involved in purchasing corresponding 
services or goods outside the firm.
Since the mid-1970s, economists have further developed 
and extended the Coase analysis by elaborating more fully on 
the roles of contracting for goods and services and the 
ownership of assets in determining what is coordinated within 
the firm and what is coordinated by markets. Grossman and 
Hart (1986) noted that the combination of uncertainty and 
complexity makes contracting with inside or outside parties 
difficult. In the presence of less than fully specified contracts, 
ownership and control of assets is synonymous with ownership 
of the rights not otherwise covered by contract. Thus, the ease 
or difficulty of contracting plays a major role in determining 
what occurs inside the firm. Ownership demarcates the 
boundary of the firm’s internal activities, which often involve 
the “noncontractible” aspects of the firm’s activities. In the 
Grossman and Hart analysis, bringing activities under 
common ownership (integration) makes economic sense 
whenever efficiency gains from improved information and 
coordination within the firm exceed the efficiency losses 
resulting from the reduced entrepreneurial incentive of the 
manager who is no longer an owner.
The basic implication of this literature is that activities will 
be performed inside the firm when the complexity or costs of 
performing them outside the firm are high. For a diversified 
financial firm, these insights can be applied to interactions 
between the various units within the firm. In this setting, we 
can think of activities conducted by a corporate parent on a 
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firmwide basis as coordination “inside” the firm, while 
activities conducted independently by separate units of the 
firm are analogous to the “market” activities discussed in Coase 
and in Grossman and Hart. Following this logic, risk 
management and other corporate control activities will be 
conducted on a consolidated basis when it is too difficult or 
costly for the individual business units to contract among 
themselves.
The type of spillover effects and interrelated risks discussed 
above arguably create just such a situation. When the actions of 
one business unit in a diversified firm potentially affect the 
risks faced by others, the contracting problem—in this case, 
what risk exposures may be undertaken by the various business 
units within the firm—becomes very complex to solve on a 
bilateral basis. In such circumstances, the incentives to create a 
centrally run, consolidated risk management system may be 
strong.
Fungibility of Financial Resources
That consolidated risk management allows the firm to allocate 
capital efficiently further reinforces the interdependence 
between a firm’s business units. The fungibility of capital 
within the firm—what some have called a firm’s internal 
capital market—means that the risks undertaken by one unit 
can affect the resources available to another through the 
workings of the internal capital market. In considering risk in 
relation to the capital resources available to back that risk, then, 
an additional dimension is that those resources may also be 
called into play to back the activities of other units within the 
firm.13
The financial institution’s internal capital market is itself an 
example of coordination within the firm potentially being 
more efficient than external markets. Gertner, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1994) attribute the efficiency of internal capital markets 
to the strong incentive that owners have to monitor capital use 
relative to debtholders, especially if many aspects of the firm’s 
capital use are not limited by the debtholders’ contract. In 
addition, capital allocated to an unsuccessful project can be 
shifted to another use within the firm at less cost than would be 
involved in liquidating the assets of the project in the market, if 
capital and resources in one use are close enough substitutes for 
those in other activities. As discussed earlier, these benefits are 
offset by a reduction in incentives to managers who no longer 
act like owners.
Froot and Stein (1998) offer a model of capital allocation 
and capital structure for financial firms that develops the 
relationship between risk management and capital allocation 
formally.14 In their model, financial institutions fully hedge 
risks for which liquid markets are available. Financial 
institutions have incentives to engage in risk management 
whenever they face risks that cannot be traded in liquid 
markets because they need to hold capital against the 
nontradable positions according to the amount of risk in the 
portfolio.15 The desirability of any given investment depends 
on the extent to which its nontradable risk is correlated with 
the nontradable risks of the firm’s other portfolio positions. 
Drawing this point to its logical conclusion, Froot and Stein 
argue that “this line of reasoning suggests that the right 
question is not whether or not the bank should centralize its 
decisionmaking, but rather how often headquarters should 
gather information and use this pooled information to help 
guide investment decisions.”
The firm’s liquidity resources (assets that can be liquidated 
as well as funding sources that can be tapped) can be viewed as 
fungible across the firm in much the same way that capital is 
fungible (in the absence of regulatory or other constraints). For 
this reason, liquidity resources virtually always are coordinated 
centrally for the firm as a whole (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2000a). These resources are available to provide 
cash needed to meet obligations, especially in contingency 
situations such as market distress.
This interdependency suggests that consolidated risk 
management systems should take liquidity considerations into 
account. Liquidity risk assessment requires knowledge of the 
size and nature of the firm’s risk positions, while the firm’s 
liquidity risk position should influence the amount and type of 
risk that business managers choose to take. One approach to 
recognizing this connection is to extend the concept of capital 
adequacy to encompass the ability to liquidate assets or easily 
fund them, as is intended by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s capital rule for registered broker-dealers. 
Alternatively, an integrated risk assessment approach could 
consider liquidity risk along with market, credit, and other 
risks in scenario analyses intended to test the impact of the 
scenario on capital adequacy (and ultimately solvency) and 
liquidity, in a test of dual constraints.
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Finally, the risks introduced by leverage reinforce the need 
to evaluate risk on a firmwide basis. Most financial firms are 
leveraged, and over the course of the 1990s analysts in financial 
institutions and their supervisors have recognized that many 
methods can be used to increase leverage in addition to 
increasing balance sheet debt to equity, such as taking positions 
through the use of derivatives and imbedded optionality. Since 
leverage increases the risk supported by capital, a sophisticated 
risk assessment should incorporate the combined effects of all 
sources of market and credit risks, of liquidity risk, and of 
leverage on capital. This point was made by the Counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group (1999) in its private sector 
report on lessons learned from the 1998 de facto failure of 
Long-Term Capital Management, a large hedge fund. The 
report suggests several measures that can be used to conduct a 
risk and capital or liquidity adequacy analysis.
Debtholders and Other Creditors
Financial institutions may have additional incentives to engage 
in consolidated risk management because of the concerns of 
debtholders and other creditors.16 In agreeing to extend credit, 
these parties must take into account the moral hazard incentive 
that the firm has to increase its risk exposure—to the benefit of 
the firm’s shareholders and the detriment of its creditors—
once the credit has been extended. This situation is particularly 
acute for financial firms, which can change their risk profiles 
relatively rapidly using derivatives and other liquid financial 
instruments. In the face of this uncertainty, creditors may 
charge higher rates or offer less favorable nonprice terms (for 
instance, shorter maturity or higher collateral) than they would 
if this incentive could be addressed.
Consolidated risk management systems provide a way for 
financial institutions to make a credible commitment against 
such behavior. In particular, these systems facilitate better 
disclosure by providing a consistent and comprehensive 
assessment of the firm’s true risk exposure that can be used by 
creditors to monitor the institution’s activities. In the absence 
of such systems, it can be significantly more difficult for 
analysts to draw an accurate picture of the firm’s overall risk 
exposure, even if the individual units within the firm make 
extensive disclosures of their risk profiles. Furthermore, the 
centralized and independent risk management units that nearly 
always are a key feature of consolidated risk management 
systems provide an internal check against any incentives for 
individual units or employees within the firm to hide risk 
exposures from senior management. Finally, the enhanced 
disclosure made possible by consolidated risk management 
systems may mitigate some of the spillover effects described 
above by providing meaningful information about the true 
extent and nature of linkages between various businesses 
within the consolidated firm.17 Thus, these systems can provide 
an important tool for management to address the moral hazard 
concerns of creditors and to obtain better borrowing terms as a 
result.
Spillover effects, the fungibility of resources, and the 
concerns of debtholders and creditors suggest that firms have 
strong incentives to measure risks well, to take advantage of 
diversification benefits, and to manage capital and liquidity 
efficiently. In the next section, we examine why firms have not 
been faster to adopt consolidated risk management to take 
advantage of even small diversification effects and why both 
industry and supervisory efforts have been necessary to 
encourage its use.
Obstacles to Creating Consolidated 
Risk Management Systems
That firms have not immediately adopted consolidated risk 
management systems suggests that there are significant costs or 
obstacles that historically have led firms to manage risk in a 
more segmented fashion. While the firm can invest in two 
business activities, as discussed above, it finds the two activities 
to be in some sense segregated, so that taking advantage of 
diversification effects engenders costs. The segregation can be 
geographical (such as New York versus London) or conceptual 
(for example, loans versus over-the-counter options).
Information Costs
Segregation creates two kinds of costs. The first is information 
costs—the costs of integrating and analyzing information from 
the two business lines. Those costs involve both the resources 
Consolidated risk management systems . . . 
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involved in transmitting, recording, and processing the 
information and the amount of decay in the time value of the 
information, reflecting the lags in assembling and verifying 
information. At any given moment, there may be competing 
information technologies with similar scale effects, but a 
different mix of costs in terms of monetary outlays and time 
to assemble information (for instance, a highly automated 
process versus a manual one).
Information costs are shaped largely by technology. 
Information systems tend to have substantial fixed costs that 
usually increase with the size of the information system, but 
low marginal costs until the particular system approaches 
capacity. To reflect that, we consider the total information cost 
function to be a step function increasing discretely as the scale 
of the business increases. For a given volume of information, 
then, the value of recognizing the impact of diversification—
which is a function of the amount of diversification inherent in 
the firm’s activities—needs to exceed the information costs for 
the scale of the firm’s business in order for the firm to invest in 
the information infrastructure. In essence, the firm maximizes 
its expected profits subject to a capital constraint by choosing 
the business mix, the scale of business, and the information 
technology (or none) to manage risk.18
Information costs will tend to limit the size of the business 
for a given level of capital. If the firm finds the cost of 
information high relative to the diversification benefit, the firm 
will manage each business separately, and in doing so, it will 
assign relatively high amounts of capital to each business line as 
if there was no diversification benefit. As a result, the scale of 
the firm’s overall business will be lower than it would be when 
diversification effects can be realized.19
Improvements in technology reduce fixed information 
costs, make it possible for firms to take greater advantage of 
diversification benefits, and increase the scale on which certain 
businesses can be conducted. For example, improvements in 
information technology permit banks and securities firms to 
manage single “global books,” in contrast to the regional 
approach used to manage most international businesses in the 
1970s and 1980s.
Finally, the value of information has risen as the pace of 
developments has picked up and the complexity of financial 
relationships among markets and counterparties has increased. 
If we interpret the increased speed of events as an increase in 
the variability of the risks and correlations associated with a 
financial firm’s different business lines, then, ceteris paribus, 
firms would tend to set necessarily more conservative limits on 
their activities—perhaps in line with the maximum possible 
values of the risk exposures of their various units.20 Since these 
maxima would rarely be observed together in practice, there 
would appear to be substantial opportunities for gains from 
identifying and responding to changes in the diversification 
benefit. But greater volatility in the underlying risk 
relationships also changes the set of relevant information 
technologies, since at any scale of activity most “low-tech,” 
time-intensive techniques become unacceptably costly, 
reflecting the rapid decay in the value of information. Thus, in 
a more volatile environment, we might expect the ability to 
design and implement effective technology-intensive risk 
management information systems to represent a significant 
dimension of competitiveness for financial institutions seeking 
to operate in a large number of markets.21
Regulatory Costs
Regulatory barriers to moving capital and liquidity within a 
financial organization impose another cost that inhibits the use 
of consolidated risk management. These barriers can take the 
form of business line capital and liquidity requirements set by 
regulators, prohibitions or limits on capital and funds that can 
be transferred from one business line to another, or the 
necessity of seeking prior approval or giving prior notice to 
move funds between business lines. Most commonly, business 
lines segregated from one another by such regulatory 
requirements are in different locations or different legal 
entities, subjecting the two business lines to different 
regulations. However, similar types of costs can be imposed by 
rating agencies, creditors, or even investors when the 
requirements or expectations they set differ across individual 
entities.
As with information costs, we can consider the regulatory 
costs to reflect both monetary outlays to manage or circumvent 
regulatory barriers and the waiting period or decay in profit 
opportunities in the time needed to comply with or overcome 
regulatory costs. While in some cases regulatory requirements 
can make it virtually impossible to move capital or liquidity 
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from one business line to another in the short run, in many 
cases regulatory requirements can be satisfied at some cost. The 
cost of managing and circumventing regulatory requirements 
appears to have dropped substantially through the use of 
derivatives, securitization techniques, and other financial 
engineering. Indeed, a recurring pattern in financial regulation 
is the erosion of regulatory requirements through financial 
innovation and regulatory arbitrage and their eventual repeal. 
That pattern dates back at least to the creation of the Eurodollar 
market in the 1960s and the subsequent slow removal of 
deposit ceilings and many reserve requirements. If regulatory 
circumvention is not possible, in the longer term the firm can 
plan its organization and its capital and funding strategy to 
create more flexibility in managing regulatory requirements, 
usually at the cost of holding excess capital and liquidity in 
some units.
Therefore, for a given scale of its various businesses, there 
are regulatory costs that the firm can minimize to some extent. 
Once again, the firm will invest in information technology and 
management of regulatory requirements only if the 
diversification benefits (taking into account the ability to 
manage capital and liquidity on a very short-term basis under 
contingencies) are seen to exceed the information and 
regulatory costs. Moreover, the reduction of regulatory barriers 
to moving capital and liquidity within the firm enables the 
development or enlargement of the firm’s internal capital 
market and increases the gains from pooling risk measurement 
information within the firm as well as the firm’s overall 
efficiency.
Financial Condition
Intensive work on consolidated risk management has 
coincided with the rebuilding of the financial strength of many 
banking organizations following the difficulties of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. For instance, a 1998 Federal Reserve 
study of credit risk models (Federal Reserve System Task Force 
on Internal Credit Risk Models 1998) notes that large U.S. 
banks have begun to develop both advanced credit risk 
modeling and internal capital allocation systems only since the 
mid-1990s—just the period over which these institutions 
recovered from the financial stresses of the earlier part of the 
decade. These internal capital allocation systems are one of the 
key elements in banks’ attempts to evaluate the risk-adjusted 
performance of their various business units. As such, they 
represent an important step in the progress toward full-fledged 
consolidated risk management systems.22
This financial rebuilding may also have contributed to the 
growing emphasis on consolidated risk management systems. 
As argued above, one key motivation for consolidated risk 
management is to enable firms to make more informed 
judgments about where to invest their scarce capital resources, 
in particular, about where to expand through acquisition or 
internal growth. Firms in weakened financial condition are 
unlikely to be in a position to fund such growth—even into 
lines of business where the institution’s risk/return trade-off is 
highly favorable—so they have less incentive to invest in the 
consolidated risk management systems that would permit 
them to identify such opportunities. The improved financial 
condition of many institutions since the early part of the 1990s 
therefore may have provided an additional incentive for firms 
to develop and implement consolidated risk management 
systems.
Declining information costs, eroding regulatory barriers, 
and stronger financial condition present fairly stylized 
explanations for increased attention by financial institutions to 
consolidated risk management and internal capital allocation 
activities. However, the optimization problem faced by firms is 
more complex than we have described. Holmstrom and 
Roberts (1998) provide many examples of the rich variety of 
mechanisms used to coordinate activities within and among 
firms and the multiplicity of factors that influence the 
coordination decision. The examples particularly illustrate the 
roles that incentives in internal (implicit) and external 
contracts and information flows play in resolving complex 
coordination problems, including overcoming regulatory 
barriers.23 The implication is that coordination mechanisms 
used by individual firms may change as a wide variety of factors 
change. The current importance of consolidated risk 
management as a goal for many financial institutions could be 
enhanced or complemented by further advances in 
information technology and monitoring techniques, new 
designs for incentive contracts with employees and outside 
agents, better public and private information flows, and greater 
liquidity of financial markets.
Even so, the decline of information costs and the erosion 
and repeal of regulatory barriers have been so great that many 
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of the principal hurdles to consolidated risk management 
within a financial conglomerate involve problems in 
measuring, comparing, and aggregating risks across business 
lines. The ability to merge banks and insurance companies 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act provides financial 
institutions with new opportunities to diversify risks and 
expand internal capital markets and creates further impetus to 
develop consolidated risk management techniques for financial 
conglomerates. Thus, both firms and supervisors are probably 
closer today in their common interest in accurate and precise 
risk measurement than they were just five years ago.
Major Technical Challenges 
and Research Questions
The previous sections discussed the economic rationale behind 
consolidated risk management and some of the costs facing 
diversified financial firms in constructing such systems. In this 
section, we turn to some additional practical problems 
associated with this overall goal. Our goal is to highlight a series 
of practical issues where additional research by risk 
management practitioners and by academics would be 
especially beneficial. In particular, we describe some of the 
technical challenges involved in actually estimating an 
aggregate measure of risk for a diversified financial institution 
and suggest some areas where further research could help both 
financial institutions and supervisors understand the strengths 
and weaknesses of such aggregate risk management.
At a very general level, there does appear to be an emerging 
consensus about how various forms of risk should be 
quantified. Most risk measurement methods used by major 
financial institutions are intended to capture potential losses 
over some future horizon due to the risk in question. These 
methods can use a probability-weighted approach to 
estimating potential losses (as in a value-at-risk or earnings-at-
risk system, where the distribution of future earnings is 
calculated) or can provide point estimates of potential losses 
under certain extreme circumstances (as in a stress test or 
scenario analysis approach or in an “expected tail loss” 
estimation). The common thread is the focus on potential 
future losses, either to earnings or economic value.24
Beyond this general consensus, however, the picture is 
considerably more complex. As noted above, an aggregate risk 
measure must incorporate different types of risk (market, 
credit, operational) and must bring together risks across 
different business lines (banking, insurance, securities). 
Although the broad risk concept applied within and across 
these two dimensions may be similar, the details differ 
considerably, making simple “bottom-up” aggregation 
approaches difficult, if not impossible, to implement.
Aggregating across business lines presents challenges 
because firms and functional supervisors in the different 
business lines have tended to approach risk management and 
measurement from quite different perspectives. For instance, 
banks traditionally have emphasized the risks arising from the 
asset side of the balance sheet (credit risk) and from the 
interaction of assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions 
(interest rate risk, liquidity risk). Insurers, in contrast, have 
tended to place emphasis on the risks arising from the liability 
side of their business (underwriting risk, catastrophe risk). 
Securities firms have tended to emphasize the combination of 
market risk and liquidity (meaning both the ability to fund or 
to sell an asset) in their portfolios. Of course, advances in 
financial theory and market practice have eroded these 
distinctions somewhat, and many firms now attempt to 
measure the way in which risks can interact and affect an entire 
institution.25 Nonetheless, one of the key challenges of 
consolidated risk management is to integrate these different 
perspectives on risk into a coherent framework.
A related set of challenges arises when aggregating across 
different types of risk. These challenges reflect the fact that at 
many financial institutions, risk measurement and 
management began as a bottom-up process, with different 
types of risk measured separately. A particular business area 
would develop risk measurement approaches to capture the 
most important risks facing that unit: credit risk for lending 
activities, market risk for trading, interest rate risk for the 
treasury/asset-liability management function. This risk-by-risk 
approach has resulted in industry standards of risk 
measurement that differ significantly across risk types, and 
sometimes across activities with similar risks, both in the way 
that risk is measured and in the extent to which it is quantified 
at all.
To a large extent, the state of development of modeling 
technology across the various risks reflects the availability of 
data and the nature of the risk itself, which can affect the ease 
or difficulty involved in accurately modeling the risk. At one 
end of the spectrum, the banking and securities industry has a 
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now fairly long history of measuring market risk through 
value-at-risk models. The fact that value-at-risk models were 
among the first statistical risk models developed reflects the 
high-frequency and largely continuous nature of market risk 
and its management,26 the mark-to-market environment in 
which most trading activities occur, and the resultant ease of 
modeling (normality has often been assumed) and availability 
of comparatively long historical data series around which to 
calibrate the models.
Credit risk tends to exhibit somewhat lower frequency 
variation, as changes in credit status tend to evolve over weeks 
or months rather than on a day-to-day basis. Thus, fewer 
historical data are available to aid in model calibration, and the 
modeling process itself is more complex, as the distribution of 
credit losses is quite asymmetric with a long right-hand tail.27 
Financial institutions have made considerable progress over 
the past two or three years in credit risk modeling, but it is fair 
to say that these models are at an earlier stage of development 
than the value-at-risk models used for market risk 
assessment.28
Even further down the spectrum is operational risk—the 
risk stemming from the failure of computer systems, control 
procedures, and human error—which captures a mixture of 
events, some of which involve relatively frequent small losses 
(settlement errors in a trading operation, for instance) and 
others that are characterized by infrequent but often large 
losses (widespread computer failure). Consistent data sources 
on this form of risk are difficult to obtain, especially for the less 
frequent events; statistical modeling is in its early stages; and 
the computational requirements may be substantial, given the 
number of “control points” in most operational processes.
Liquidity risk measurement involves many similar issues 
of sorting the frequency of different types of events and 
developing appropriate data. Liquidity risk measurement has 
long involved scenario analysis focused on stress events and 
based on subjective probabilities of how depositors, other 
creditors, and borrowers would respond to the stress event. As 
risk measurement techniques have advanced, some financial 
institutions are examining the potential for cash-flow-at-risk 
analysis, based on more formal measurement of the probability 
of events and the sensitivity of cash flows to these events, both 
to enhance day-to-day liquidity management and to 
strengthen the underpinnings of liquidity stress scenarios. 
Finally, at the far end of the spectrum, other risks—such as 
legal, reputational, and strategic risk—are rarely quantified, as 
both the data and theoretical techniques for capturing these 
risks have yet to be developed extensively.
Even for those risks that are measured, important 
differences exist in the assumptions and techniques used to 
estimate potential losses. One key issue is the time horizon over 
which potential losses are to be measured. As noted above, the 
risks facing financial institutions vary in the extent to which 
they are continuous or discrete, in how quickly new events 
develop, and in the size of events when they occur (many small 
events versus a few large ones). These differences imply the 
need for different horizons to capture different risks effectively. 
In fact, we see these differences in the assumptions underlying 
the risk estimates made by financial firms, with market risk 
typically measured over a one-day horizon, credit risk typically 
measured over a one-year horizon, and operational risk 
measured over a variety of short and long horizons (an industry 
standard has yet to emerge).
These differences present a challenge for calculating 
consolidated risk exposures that span several risk types. Should 
a single horizon be chosen for all risks and, if so, which one? 
Should the time dimension be explicitly factored into the risk 
assessment, with paths of risk over time? More generally, issues 
such as differing horizons suggest that there is an important set 
of research questions concerning methods for calculating 
aggregate risk measures. At a very basic level, can the different 
individual risk measurement approaches typically used within 
financial firms be meaningfully aggregated? If so, how? If not, 
is it possible to develop a “top-down” approach that somehow 
blends the risks facing the firm without measuring them 
separately, such as an analysis of income volatility? Is there 
some way of combining “top-down” with “bottom-up” 
approaches to consolidated risk measurement? And how does 
the growing attention to evaluating performance against risk in 
rewarding managers at all levels of the organization factor into 
these decisions?
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A related set of issues concerns the mathematical 
aggregation of risk measures across businesses and risk types. 
In most cases, this process would involve estimating 
correlations between various risk exposures. An important 
challenge in this regard is measuring the degree of correlation 
between risks in businesses that are distinct in terms of the 
sources and frequency of variability (for instance, between 
insurance underwriting and trading). The data demands of 
producing accurate estimates are likely to be enormous. Even 
when aggregate risk measures can be calculated, a related 
challenge is how to apportion the benefits of diversification 
across various business lines. That is, if less-than-perfect 
correlation across distinct business lines results in a decrease in 
the overall risk facing the firm, how should these benefits be 
allocated back to the various business units in the internal 
capital allocation process?
This discussion assumes that to produce a consolidated 
measurement of risk exposure, it is necessary to develop risk 
measures that are highly comparable across risk types. 
However, perhaps a more fundamental question is whether a 
consolidated risk management system needs to have a fully 
consolidated risk measurement methodology at its core. In 
other words, how much comparability across risk measures is 
strictly necessary to have an effective consolidated risk 
management system? If risk measures cannot be made perfectly 
compatible across risk types and business lines, are there still 
benefits to imperfectly comparable measures?
Our sense is that the answer to this question is likely to be a 
resounding yes, largely because the ability to evaluate results 
against risks taken has become a major feature of financial 
institution management in the 1990s. Some important issues 
would need to be explored before understanding the full 
implications of this conclusion. For instance, what kind of 
biases might enter the assessment of aggregate risk if this 
assessment is based on disparate risk measures? How might 
comparisons of risk and return across business lines be 
affected? How can we relate the results of stress scenario 
analysis to statistical measures of risk exposure? Are there limits 
to how different the various risk measures can be, yet still be 
useful in a consolidated risk management system? These are 
important, unresolved issues.
Conclusion
As the above discussion suggests, there is considerable scope 
for further research to enhance our understanding of the 
benefits and shortcomings of consolidated risk management. 
Many of the key research questions involve technical issues in 
risk measurement and financial series modeling. While these 
questions are vital to understanding how to calculate a 
consolidated measure of risk exposure spanning all of a 
financial institution’s businesses and risk factors, they are not 
the only questions of interest. Further research into the main 
question of this article—the economic rationale for 
consolidated risk management—could produce findings that 
would be of clear use to supervisors and financial institutions. 
In addition, this work could provide insight into such diverse 
topics as the theory of the firm, the costs/benefits of 
diversification, the linkages among financial markets, and the 
impact of product and geographic deregulation. Our study 
presents some initial ideas, but clearly much more work needs 
to be done. We hope that this article can serve as a starting 
point for further discussion.Endnotes
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1. It can also be argued that supervisors may place somewhat greater 
weight on the risk of severe downside scenarios, given the nature of the 
supervisory role, but the private sector appears to be closing any gap 
as a result of the insight gained from experiences such as the market 
disturbances in 1998.
2. Firms vary in how they use the risk management process to 
maximize profits. Some firms use risk-and-return measures in the 
selection of their medium-term business mix in order to maximize 
long-run expected profits. Firms also use risk management systems to 
assist in managing expected profits over short horizons, by seeking to 
identify changes in risk and loss potential and adjusting their 
portfolios accordingly.
3. In large measure, these efforts are an extension of a longer term 
trend toward enhanced risk management and measurement in the 
financial services industry. Many of these efforts have focused on 
developing risk measurement and management systems for individual 
risk types or businesses (for instance, market risk in a securities firm 
or credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio). In consolidated risk 
management, however, the focus is on an expansion of these single-
risk-management systems to span diverse financial activities, 
customers, and markets.
4. Mergers may occur for many reasons, including the desire to 
benefit from exactly the sort of diversification that presents challenges 
to risk management and measurement systems. In this discussion, we 
distinguish between the broad diversification that may occur when 
firms comprise business units involved in distinct business activities 
(such as banking, insurance, or securities activities) or geographic 
locations and the type of portfolio diversification that occurs when 
risk management units take steps to hedge portfolio- or business-level 
risk exposures. It is the first type of diversification—which has become 
much more feasible given the regulatory and technical developments 
discussed in the text—that presents the sort of challenges we discuss in 
this article.
5. The evaluation of the adequacy of risks in light of a full risk 
assessment is discussed in Federal Reserve SR Letter 99-18. Earlier in 
the decade, the Federal Reserve issued SR Letter 93-69, on the 
management of trading activities; SR Letter 97-32, on information 
security; SR Letter 00-04, on outsourcing; and a series of papers on the 
management of credit risk in both primary and secondary market 
activities (SR Letters 99-3, 98-25, and 97-21). The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation have issued guidance using a comparable framework for 
a similar range of topics.
6. This framework is best developed in “Principles for the 
Management of Credit Risk,” published in September 2000. The 
Committee has also published work on interest rate risk, in 1997; 
operational risk, in 1998; and liquidity risk, in 2000.
7. The work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) suggests that any risk-altering actions taken by a 
firm’s management are redundant and resource-wasting because 
shareholders can achieve their optimal degree of diversification 
independently. See Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1998) for a 
discussion of the factors—such as bankruptcy costs, taxes, and costly 
external financing—that may make it worthwhile for firms to engage 
in risk management.
8. This relationship can be expressed mathematically as
,
where   and   are the profit volatilities of business units A and B 
and   is the correlation between them.
9. This situation was not uncommon among globally dispersed 
institutions prior to the introduction of enhanced information 
systems in the early-to-mid-1990s. Later in this article, we discuss the 
role of information costs and information systems in diversified 
financial institutions.
10. Morris and Shin (1999) describe this problem in the context of 
multiple firms operating in a single market. They describe the errors 
in risk assessment that can occur when risk management systems 
assume that the firm’s activities are similar to playing roulette 
(gambling against nature), when in fact the risks are more like those in 
poker (where the actions of the other players matter). The same 
analogy can be applied to risks within a firm.
11. Or, as discussed below, such contagion fears may arise because 
market observers believe that the resources of all of the firm’s business 
units will be used to “rescue” a troubled unit, calling into question the 
solvency of all of the businesses within the firm.
12. The large investments that many financial institutions are making 
in electronic trading and banking are examples of strategic risk related 
to establishing the competitive position of a firm in a fast-changing 
and greatly contested market. The problems many financial 
institutions experienced in the mid-1990s—when customers 
experienced large losses in connection with derivatives and complex 
trading strategies—are examples of strategic risk related to damage to 
the firm’s reputation.
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13. Froot and Stein (1998) consider a variant of this risk—the 
bankwide cost of capital effect—that involves the impact of increased 
capital costs on all units within a firm when one unit takes on large 
amounts of risk.
14. In the Froot and Stein analysis, banks choose their capital 
structure, risk management policies, and investment policies jointly, 
rather than impose a short-run capital constraint. However, when 
capital is costly, banks economize on the amount of capital they hold 
and therefore take risk management concerns into account in their 
investment policies.
15. The example Froot and Stein give is the counterparty risk on a 
foreign exchange swap. With the advent of credit derivatives and other 
credit risk management techniques, such risks are increasingly 
tradable, by which Froot and Stein mean that the risks can be offset 
to achieve a zero net present value. Nontradable risks can include 
unhedged proprietary positions premised on subjective expected rates 
of return deviating from those of the market. Note that the reliance on 
markets for hedging for liquid risks and internal capital allocation for 
nontradable risks is another version of the contractible/
noncontractible distinction discussed earlier.
16. Other creditors here could include suppliers, consultants, and 
other contractors who provide products or services in return for the 
promise of future payment.
17. This would be especially true if there were meaningful disclosures 
about intrafirm exposures, as called for in a recent report by the Joint 
Forum (1999b).
18. As information systems become more “scalable,” the step function 
may become flatter, in effect making it easier to realize and manage the 
diversification benefits from combining activities.
19. This is also consistent with the analysis of Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1994), which derives analytically that enhancements to 
performance measurement tend to permit greater employee freedom 
(such as higher limits), although the authors caution that their analysis 
requires a careful specification of the exact problem.
20. Correlations and volatilities have changed substantially over time. 
Examples include the sharp drop in volatilities in short-term interest 
rates associated with the decline in inflation in the 1980s and early 
1990s; sharp increases in the correlations and short-term volatilities of 
U.S. long-term fixed income instruments in times of distress; and a 
rise in the idiosyncratic risk of equities in the 1990s, the last example 
documented in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001).
21. Gibson (1998) derives similar conclusions about the impact of 
declining information costs. In his approach, risk measurement is a 
means to monitor risk-taking by employees when information about 
the managerial effort of those employees (or outside agents, such as 
mutual fund managers) is not observable by the employer.
22. Typically, these internal capital allocation systems fall short of a 
full-fledged consolidated risk measurement system, either because 
they incorporate only a limited range of the risks facing a financial 
institution (for example, just credit risk or market risk, but not 
operational or other forms of risk) or because they are applied only to 
a subset of the institution’s activities.
23. The specific regulatory barrier they cite is the limitations on 
foreign ownership of domestic airlines.
24. Other potential definitions of risk could involve pure volatility 
measures, such as standard deviations of earnings or economic value, 
or sensitivity measures that capture the derivative of earnings or 
economic value with respect to particular risk factors, such as the 
“value of a basis point.”
25. Lewis (1998), for instance, describes how one insurance company 
examines stress scenarios that affect all aspects of the firm, such as an 
earthquake that simultaneously causes extremely high insurance 
claims and disrupts financial markets—and thus the firm’s 
investments and investment income—for some period of time.
26. Of course, some market price series exhibit sharp, discontinuous 
jumps, such as those associated with emerging market developments 
and unexpected changes in exchange rate regimes. These factors have 
tended to be incorporated into value-at-risk models after the initial 
phases of model development.
27. To some extent, both the lack of data and the lower frequency 
variation reflect the current GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles) accounting standards, which do not require the daily 
marking-to-market to which trading account positions are subject. 
Thus, shorter term variation in value may not be reflected in the 
accounting data typically available for use in credit risk models.
28. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a) for a 
discussion of the state of development of credit risk models.References
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